An analytical solution to the lab-equipment growth model (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991) with an exogenous imitation rate is presented and applied to study the policy tradeo¤ between weaker levels of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection yielding more consumption today, and stronger levels yielding more growth tomorrow. This has already been studied in Kwan and Lai (2003) ; however, a mistake in writing out the dynamics of the problem has contaminated that analysis. For the whole parameter space considered there, the conclusion is no longer to strengthen IPR protection partially, but fully. The tradeo¤ persists, though, for di¤erent choices of parameters.
Introduction
It is well known that the issue of protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) presents governments with a tradeo¤. On the one hand, by lessening the public-good character of ideas and being bene…cial to entrepreneurship, IPR protection alleviates possible underinvestment problems that arise in the knowledge market and may, thereby, foster economic growth and welfare. 1 On the other hand, by favoring a less competitive economic environment, it might also bring about a short-term welfare reduction.
We work within the "lab equipment" general-equilibrium model of endogenous growth of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), in which the R&D sector uses …nal good as input for the production of blueprints. Here, R&D is responsible for "horizontal" innovation (in product variety), in contrast to Schumpeterian "vertical" innovation (in product quality). Added to the model is an exogenous imitation rate (as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, ch. 6, or
Gancia and Zilibotti, 2005, sec. 2.3), associated with the prevailing level of IPR protection.
The …rst e¤ect above, related to long-term growth, derives essentially from the usual Euler equation, as will be seen in Section 2. By giving the model a complete analytical solution (unlike any other analyses of this model of which we are aware in the literature), it becomes possible to precisely gauge the second e¤ect, the one which emerges from the instantaneous change in the consumption level (Section 3). In this way all the welfare gains/losses related to a change in IPR-protection policy can be taken into account.
Kwan and Lai (2003) uses this same model in order to analyze optimal patent
protection. However, that analysis contains a mistake in the writing out of the dynamics of the problem which ends up contaminating the results.
This paper shows, in contrast with Kwan and Lai (2003) , that for the whole set of parameter vectors considered there, the optimal policy is always that of providing full protection of IPR. This is to say that, when restricted to the parameter values used by Kwan and Lai, the IPR-protection tradeo¤ has in fact a corner solution, in which case governments should always pursue an imitation rate equal to zero. Examples based on other parameter values are provided, though, in order to show that this tradeo¤ may have interior solutions as well. In these cases, the optimal policy may be that of a partial tightening or a loosening of IPR protection (or inaction).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and covers the growth e¤ect of the IPR-protection tradeo¤. Section 3 gives the closed-form solution for its balanced growth path and evaluates the current-consumption e¤ect. Section 4 builds on the foundations established in the two previous sections to consider the optimal IPR-protection problem. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The representative household seeks to maximize
where u is the CRRA function
, subject to the resource constraint
where consumption c is in terms of the …nal good, r is the rate of return on assets held b (which equal b 0 at time 0 and must be nonnegative for su¢ ciently advanced time), and w is the wage rate paid by …nal-good …rms. Implicit here are time subscripts, the fact that individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor to these …rms, and the normalization of the price in the …nal goods market to 1. This program implies the standard Euler equation
as well as the transversality condition r > (throughout the paper, '^'will stand for growth rate).
Firm i 2 I produces …nal goods following the Ethier (1982) production function
where L i is labor input, x i;j is the quantity of index-j intermediate good being used as input, to which an elasticity of 2 (0; 1) corresponds, and A is the measure of existing intermediate goods. In order to maximize pro…t Y i wL i R A 0 p j x i;j dj, the demand of the …rm (who is a taker of prices p j in the intermediate goods market) satis…es
Let
, where L := P i2I L i . It is convenient to write (2) in an aggregate form, noting that x i;j =L i = x j =L:
The lab equipment model prescribes that the representative of the R&D sector who invented intermediate good j will produce it using a unit of the …nal good. Thus, it chooses p j seeking to maximize (p j 1) x j . The resulting price is p j = 1 . If IPR protection regarding this good is lost somehow, the inventor is no longer a price maker and will have to accept for p j his marginal cost, 1. Following Krugman (1979) , an exogenous imitation rate of m > 0, underlying the patent-breaking process, is assumed:
where both A (0) and A c (0) are given. Here, [0; A c ] is the set indexing intermediates whose patents have been broken (or secrets have been discovered), while (A c ; A] are those still being protected. The rate m is inversely related to the level of enforcement of IPR protection laws. So the demand for intermediates can be written as
> :
Finally, entry into the R&D sector is conditioned to the possibility of being rewarded with monopoly rents to the extent that IPR is being protected. The relevant rate of return to the potential innovator is the interest rate adjusted, through a no-arbitrage argument, for imitation risk: r + m. 2 He must check if the present value of the returns from discovering intermediate good j pays at least the cost of invention, which is assumed to be a constant, > 0. Assuming there is free entry into the R&D sector of the economy, the "pays at least" in the previous sentence becomes in equilibrium "pays exactly", and, at a given time s,
, whence at all times it is necessary to have
2 For this argument in detail, the reader is referred to Gancia and Zilibotti (2005, ft. 11).
From (7) and (1), we see that in order to guarantee a nonnegative growth rate , the upper bound (L= ) (
should be imposed on m.
By plugging (7) into the Euler equation (1) 
That is, total product, net of resources used in the production of intermediates, is used for either consumption or innovation. Plugging (6) into (4) gives
Following Kwan and Lai (2003) , consider two new variables, a scaled version of consumption, h := C= ( A), and the fraction of intermediate goods that have already been (5)). In order to …ndÂ, one …rst plugs (6) into (4), obtaining
Dividing both sides of (9) by A yieldŝ
We thus get the model's equilibria full dynamics:
where 1 := 1 + ( + ( 1)) > 0. 4 This implies + 2 will always be negative, irrespective of the m chosen. Simply taking the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 0:5 will do the job, for instance. Now, sinceĥ ! 0 on the equilibrium path toward the steady state, we haveÂ ! .
Dividing both sides of (4) by
(1 g) , a constant,
), a constant, so that alsoX ! . Therefore, the long-run growth rate of the gross domestic product Y X is also (and GDP per capita as well, since L is constant). Since we have already seen that d =dm = 1= < 0, we get a simple 3 It may be noted that this dynamical system is not equivalent to expression 8 in Kwan and Lai (2003) ,
where the left-hand sides should readĝ andĥ instead. This mistake was carried on throughout that paper. 4 By 'minimal'it should be understood a condition not depending on a speci…c m.
con…rmation of one of the e¤ects mentioned in the introduction:
Proposition 1 Stronger (weaker) IPR protection brings faster (slower) long-run growth of the economy. This e¤ect is more important the less risk-averse (or the more intertemporally-elastic) society is.
Also, as shown in Appendix A, one has dg=dm > 0 and dh=dm > 0. Thus two other long-term e¤ects of strengthening the enforcement of IPR protection laws are a lower fraction of intermediates which have been imitated g and a lower consumption/assets ratio h. Welfare e¤ects will be addressed in full in Section 4.
Analytical solution
At this point, one possibility is to …nd a linear approximation or a numerical solution to the path (g; h) approaching g; h , as attempted in Kwan and Lai (2003) .
However, it may be noted that equation (11) its exact solution can also be sought for. 5 By imposing the terminal condition
; h (t)) = g; h , one obtains the following expression for the stable saddle path:
where g 0 is the given g (0) (since both A (0) and A c (0) are given), and
is the negative root of 1 x 2 + ( 2 m) x + m = 0. Checkings are done in Appendix B.
Note that the stable solution (12) is simply a straight line in the phase diagram. 6 Since
, the method employed to solve (11) also rewards us with an exact, explicit and elementary solution for h 0 (= h (0)):
Equation ( Assume that government mandates for such a change. For example, a tightening of patent protection, so that m is lowered to m 0 . Then, although (7) implies that 1 and 2 remain unaltered, it also forces the movement in r to instantaneously counterbalance the movement in m, with no transitional dynamics whatsoever, so that r 0 = r (m 0 m), and 6 In case this fact is somehow seen in advance (and assuming one is interested solely in the stable solution), an alternative course of action would be to …rst use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients (in this case,
) to transform the system of di¤erential equations (11) If the economy were initially at the steady state g; h , we then have
and h initially jumping from h to Proof. In Appendix C it is shown that
and d =dm = (1 ) = 1 < 0, where is the other zero of 1 x 2 + ( 2 m) x + m.
Since this parabola is concave and at x = 0 takes on a positive (or zero if m = 0) value, while at x = 1 it takes on the negative value 1 + 2 , we have 2 [0; 1).
From (17), it is immediate that, if
1, then dh 0 =dm > 0, as wished. And since
where (1) was used in the calculation of d =d , in order to conclude that dh 0 =dm > 0 irrespective of we just have to show that lim !+1 dh 0 =dm 0. Now,
which is just an a¢ ne function of g 0 , whence it su¢ ces to show that lim !+1;g 0 =0 dh 0 =dm 0 and lim !+1;g 0 =1 dh 0 =dm 0. And indeed,
and, using Girard's relation = m= ( 1 ),
Thus dh 0 =dm > 0; 8 > 0, and current consumption drops with a decrease in m. We have also shown that this e¤ect is larger the lower is -that is, d (dh 0 =dm) =d < 0.
In words, the larger the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1= ), the more people are willing to sacri…ce their current consumption today (given the establishment of a less competitive environment) in the name of more consumption from some point on in the future (since 0 > ).
Propositions 1 and 2 together con…rm that the tradeo¤ mentioned in the introduction is a sensible one, and that it can be easily explained in terms of the lab equipment model.
However, as we show in the next section, this does not mean that we should always expect it to have an interior solution. 
Thus it solves the problem of …nding m = m 0 2 h 0; (L= ) ( The math involved here is a bit more intricate than that of the previous section. We shall analyze the = 1 case mathematically, then treat the 6 = 1 case with the aid of a
computer.
An observation that will be important in the proof of the next proposition is that 7 The focus on these variables as arguments of H will be made clear in the proof of Proposition 3.
In fact, otherwise, one would have
Now, Bernoulli's inequality applied to both left-and right-hand sides of the previous inequality gives (1 + ) 1 > 1 + (1= ) = 2 and 2
contradiction.
That is, optimal IPR protection is simply absolute IPR protection, regardless of its initial level. 
we may focus on the g 0 0 = 0 (i.e., m = 0) case.
Thus we compute (with the aid of (1), which under the present hypothesis gives
, and since 1 = 2 < 1, optimal solution to the patent-policy tradeo¤ is to favor more the present, by weakening IPR protection. This can be easily visualized in any one of the graphs in Figures 2 and 3 .
Indeed, by departing from any point in the valid (non-blank) region and moving upward, regions never become darker -only lighter (whenever there is a change in color tone).
The same happens with , meaning that a higher (lower elasticity of substitution 1= ) favors the present against the future. This can be seen in any one of the graphs in Figures   1 and 3 . By starting at any valid point in the …gures and moving up (graphs of Figure 1) or to the right (graphs of Figure 3 9 We do not recalculate line 4 because we do not have the value of A(0) used there.
Conclusion
The lab-equipment/horizontal-innovation model of endogenous growth of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), coupled with an exogenous rate of imitation a la Krugman (1979) , generates a dynamical system of the Riccati type that can be solved analytically. This solution allows
for an illustration of the IPR-protection tradeo¤ between long-run growth on one side, and short-run consumption on the other. This is shown in Propositions 1 and 2.
Our results show that, when = 1, the optimal IPR protection is always a full one 
Appendix A
We know that
where the second equality is an application of (7). Then
and, since h = 1 g 2 and both 1 and 2 don't vary with m (because of (7)), we get
Therefore h is minimum with m = 0, in which case
where the last equality used (7).
Appendix B
We …rst check for the validity of the limits lim t!+1 g (t) = g and lim t!+1 h (t) = h. Given (12), we see that the limits follow immediately from inequality + 2 + 1 > 0, which holds due to Girard's relation:
where is the other zero of 1 x 2 + ( 2 m) x + m, as mentioned in the proof of Proposition 2. As remarked there, 0, so that m + 1 m + > 0, as wished.
We now check that (12) indeed solves (11) . First an auxiliary calculation, based on the fact that h = h= (g ) (g ):
Before moving on to the motion equation for g, a second auxiliary calculation, which departs from the …rst one in this appendix:
where the third equality follows from the quadratic de…ning , and the fourth from the expression for g. Since g = + (g ) =h h, we then get
Appendix C
We start with a di¤erent but equivalent expression for h 0 . From (14) , 
Appendix D
Here we deal with the = 1 case. Let H : R + [0; 1] f1g ! R be such that H (m; g 0 ; 1) = log h 0 (m; g 0 ) + (m) = (the second line entry in (19)), where h 0 is given in (14) , and comes from plugging (7) into (1). The derivatives dh 0 =dm and d =dm have already been evaluated, in Appendices C and A respectively. In order to obtain the …rst two derivatives of H, the derivatives of will also be needed. The …rst one has been found in the previous appendix. Similarly, Tables   Table 1   1 
